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Global Regulation of Germline Genome 
Editing:   
Ethical Considerations and Application of 
International Human Rights Law 
SCOTT J. SCHWEIKART* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Genome editing is a biomedical tool that can make “precise altera-
tions, additions, [and] deletions” to an organism’s genetic makeup.1 In 
2018, the world was shocked by the birth of twin girls in China,2 the first 
children to have their genomes modified by the powerful new gene-edit-
ing tool,  CRISPR. The news was crucial for two reasons: (1) the altera-
tions to the twin girls’ genomes was a form of germline genome editing, 
meaning their genetic modifications are heritable; and (2) CRISPR was a 
new gene-editing tool known for its revolutionary precision, ease of use, 
and cost. CRISPR technology possesses potential to be far reaching and 
broad in its impact; it can be used for human germline modification,3 as 
 
* Senior Research Associate at the American Medical Association and Legal Editor of the AMA 
Journal of Ethics. M.B.E., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Case Western Reserve University; 
B.A., Washington University in St. Louis. I would like to thank Professor Cesare Romano for in-
viting me to Loyola Law School, Los Angeles to participate in their symposium “The Challenge 
of the Creation of a Global Regulation Regime for Human Germline Genome Modification”.  
Also special thanks to my colleague Sean McConnell for helpful conservations and feedback. 
 1. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., HUMAN GENOME EDITING: SCIENCE, ETHICS, 
AND GOVERNANCE 1 (The National Academies Press 2017), https://doi.org/10.17226/24623. This 
report is an excellent introduction to genome editing and offers a terrific summation of the technol-
ogy, key governance, and ethical principles at play. 
 2. Julia Belluz, Is the CRISPR Baby Controversy the Start of a Terrifying New Chapter in 
Gene Editing?, VOX (Jan. 22, 2019, 12:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/11/
30/18119589/crispr-gene-editing-he-jiankui; Antonio Regalado, Exclusive: Chinese Scientists are 
Creating CRISPR Babies, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s
/612458/exclusive-chinese-scientists-are-creating-crispr-babies/. 
 3. David Baltimore et al., A Prudent Path Forward for Genomic Engineering and Germline 
Gene Modification, 348 SCI. 36, 36-37 (2015) (“CRISPR-Cas9 technology, as well as other genome 
engineering methods, can be used to change the DNA in the nuclei of the reproductive cells that 
transmit information from one generation to the next [i.e., an organism’s germline].”). 
TECH_TO_JCI 12/26/20  1:58 PM 
280  Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 43:3 
well as for somatic cell modification. Hence, questions and concerns 
about the ethics and governance of genome editing are now abound in the 
legal and bioethical discourse. 
Because of the global nature of the consequences that genome edit-
ing can and will yield, particularly from the perspective of germline ge-
nome editing, a global form of governance should be considered. Inter-
national human rights law provides a logical place to look for such 
governance because the consequences involve human rights matters, the 
nature of which covers the profound ethical implications that stem from 
germline genome editing (i.e., ethical implications most notably relating 
to principles of autonomy and justice which are linked to the essence of 
human rights).   
This essay explores the linkages of bioethics and international hu-
man rights law in the context of genome editing, by first giving a brief 
introduction to genome editing technology, then an examination into the 
ethics of genome editing (drawing a distinction between somatic and 
germline genome editing), and closing with a discussion of the various 
forms of international human rights law (and their limitations) relevant to 
the bioethics of germline genome editing. 
II.  HUMAN GENOME EDITING: TECHNOLOGIES AND TECHNIQUES 
To begin this discussion, a brief synopsis of genome editing—a de-
scription of the technology and how it functions—is useful. Before the 
advent of the now-popularized CRISPR (short for clustered regularly in-
terspaced palindromic repeats4), the chief genome editing tools relied on 
these primary nucleases5: meganucleases, zinc-finger nucleases (ZFNs), 
and transcription activator-like effector nucleases (TALENs).6 These nu-
cleases are effective genome editors, but they are “technically challeng-
ing, time-consuming, and expensive,” as researchers are required to de-
sign ZFNs and TALENs that will be site-specific. That is, researchers 
have to design the proteins to bind to the spot of DNA that they want to 
cut or edit.7 ZFNs and TALENs are not a favored genome editing tool 
because they are “expensive, technically challenging, and time-consum-
ing,” and require protein engineering to target specific DNA sequences.8 
 
 4. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 1, at 65. 
 5. Nucleases are enzymes that biochemically cleave DNA molecules. See id. at 62-63. 
 6. Id. at 63-64. 
 7. Id. at 65. 
 8. Arthur L. Caplan et al., No Time to Waste—the Ethical Challenges Created by CRISPR, 
16 EMBO REPS. 1421, 1421 (2015). 
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The discovery of CRISPR was monumental because CRISPR is 
much more precise, less expensive, and less time consuming compared 
to previous genome editing tools.9 Indeed, “[t]he key distinguishing fea-
ture” between CRISPR and tools like TALENs and ZFNs “is that 
[CRISPR] uses RNA sequences instead of protein segments to recognize 
specific sequences in the DNA,”10 thus allowing CRISPR to have greater 
precision. CRISPR was initially discovered to be a function of a bacte-
ria’s immunity against viruses; a discovery that “represents a major con-
ceptual advance in its own right.”11 To edit a genome using CRISPR,  
a Cas9 protein [a type of nuclease12] along with a CRISPR 
“guide RNA” can find a target gene among the thousands of 
genes in a cell’s genome and cleave both DNA strands at the 
target site. It is this cleavage event that can be exploited to create 
a mutation in, or “edit,” the target gene.13 
CRISPR can broadly employ two kinds of edits: Non-Homologous 
End Joining (NHEJ), which is an effective way to deactivate a gene; and 
Homology Directed Repair (HDR), which can help process a “gene re-
placement” type of edit. NHEJ involves a Cas9 protein essentially cutting 
the DNA and then the cut ends join together; this process “often deletes 
a few bases, which may cripple the gene product, or cause a frameshift 
that inactivates [the gene].”14 By contrast, HDR will “repair the damaged 
allele [i.e., an allele cleaved by Cas9] using another piece of DNA with 
homology to the target,”15 which will delete and insert  genetic material 
(a “gene replacement”) into the genome. 
 
 9. HENRY T. GREELY, THE END OF SEX AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 180 
(Harvard Univ. Press ed. 2016)  (“Like cars before the Model T, other genome editing methods 
existed earlier [e.g., ZFNs, TALENs], but they were expensive, difficult, and, as a result, not com-
monly used. With CRISPR/Cas9, cheap, easy, and fast genome editing is now available, like the 
Model T was, to everyman—or at least everyone with molecular biology training and a few thou-
sand dollars.”). 
 10. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 1, at 65. 
 11. Id. at 222. This point often gets overlooked in recent discussions about CRISPR technol-
ogy, especially in the popular media. The amazing biochemistry of how CRISPR-Cas9 naturally 
functions as an immunity tool is an impressive and intricate mechanism; as Carl Sagan once said, 
an example of “the awesome machinery of nature.” 
 12. Cas is short for “CRISPR-associated.” Cas proteins are a type of nuclease, i.e., “a class of 
proteins that facilitate chemical reactions” that will “cut DNA.” See John M. Conley, Introduction: 
A Lawyer’s Guide to CRISPR, 97 N.C. L. REV. 1041, 1044 (2019). 
 13. Kelly E. Ormond et al., Human Germline Genome Editing, 101 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS, 
167, 168 (2017). 
 14. Devashish Rath et al., The CRISPR-Cas Immune System: Biology, Mechanisms, and Ap-
plications, 117 BIOCHIME 119, 126 (2015) (presenting an instructive scientific explanation for how 
the CRISPR-Cas system functions). 
 15. Id. 
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Critically, there are noted frequent errors with CRISPR, such as off 
target changes to the genome and mistakes where parts of DNA are 
wiped-out or rearranged.16 We are in the early stages of this technology, 
so safety risks remain.17 In fact, there are concerns of unknown side ef-
fects that may not necessarily be harmful,18 but do carry inherent risks 
with a full range of consequences that are unknown in scope. 
Techniques for implementing genome editing technologies typically 
involve either ex vivo (outside the body) or in vivo (in the body) meth-
ods.19  Ex vivo methods involve removing the “target cell population . . . 
from the body, [which are] modified with programmable nucleases and 
then transplanted back into the original host.”20 In vivo genome editing is 
a “direct delivery of programmable nucleases to disease affected cells in 
their native tissues.”21 A viral vector is often used to deliver the nucleases 
(e.g., CRISPR-Cas9) to the targeted cell’s nucleases. 
III.  ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF HUMAN GENOME EDITING 
Before diving into the ethics of genome editing, it is important to 
first understand the key distinctions between somatic and germline ge-
nome editing. Notably, the heritable nature of germline genome editing 
as opposed to the individualistic nature of somatic genome editing  has 
profound relevance in any ethical analysis because of the divergent po-
tential consequences. 
 
 16. Ricki Lewis, Is CRISPR Gene Editing Doomed, Even as Gene Therapy Enters the Clinic?,  
DNA SCI. BLOG (Aug. 9, 2018), https://blogs.plos.org/dnascience/2018/08/09/is-crispr-gene-edit-
ing-doomed-even-as-gene-therapy-enters-the-clinic/ (noting a recent study showing a “mess of 
missing and moved chromosome parts in the wake deploying the famed ‘molecular scissors’ [i.e. 
CRISPR]”); Brad Plumer et al., A Simple Guide to CRISPR, One of the Biggest Science Stories of 
the Decade, VOX (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/7/23/17594864/crispr-cas9-gene-
editing (“Cas9 enzymes can occasionally ‘misfire’ and edit DNA in unexpected places, which in 
human cells might lead to cancer or even create news diseases.”). 
 17. Lewis, supra note 16 (noting that while there are harmful side effects of CRISPR being 
discovered now, in the long term these issues will be worked out, i.e. “[t]he unexpected genomic 
damage is simply a problem to be solved”). 
 18. Antonio Regalado, China’s CRISPR Twins Might Have Had Their Brains Inadvertently 
Enhanced, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612997/the-
crispr-twins-had-their-brains-altered/ [hereinafter China’s CRISPR Twins] (noting that with regard 
to the now famous “CRISPR twins” in China, “new research shows that the same alteration intro-
duced into the girls’ DNA, to a gene called CCR5, not only makes mice smarter but also improves 
human brain recovery after stroke, and could be linked to greater success in school”). 
 19. David Benjamin Turitz Cox et al., Therapeutic Genome Editing: Prospects and Chal-
lenges, 21 NATURE MED. 121, 126 (2015). 
 20. Id. at 126. 
 21. Id. 
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A. Somatic vs. Germline Genome Editing 
Somatic genome editing involves editing an individual’s cells in a 
part of their body, rather than the germline. Some potential therapeutic 
uses of CRISPR for somatic-based treatments may range from “cancer 
immunotherapy, to treating infectious diseases, to creating stem cell mod-
els of disease.”22 For example, CRISPR has the potential to treat diseases 
like sickle cell,23 and CRISPR gene therapy trials in China show potential 
to treat cancer and HIV by editing the genomes  of immune cells.24 Hence, 
there is great promise of therapeutic somatic cell treatments; however, 
some scholars and bioethicists have  concerns that such edits may be “en-
hancements” and not merely therapeutic measures. 
Germline genome editing (also sometimes referred to as heritable 
genome editing) refers “to all manipulations of germline cells,” which 
include primordial germ cells, gametes, zygotes and embryos.25 CRISPR 
technology can affect the germline of subsequent generations via a tool 
called a gene drive.26  A “gene drive actively copies a mutation made by 
CRISPR on one chromosome to its partner chromosome and thereby en-
sures that all offspring and subsequent generations will inherit the edited 
genome.”27 While discussion of gene drives often center around their use 
in insects (such as mosquitos), they can potentially be used in humans as 
well. 
Additionally, there is a significant level of uncertainty about the 
safety and potential consequences of germline genome editing. For in-
stance, it is uncertain “whether current knowledge of human genes, ge-
nomes, and genetic variation and the interactions between genes and the 
environment is sufficient to enable heritable genome editing to be per-
formed safely.”28 
 
 22. Caplan et al., supra note 8, at 1425. 
 23. Gina Kolata, These Patients Had Sickle-Cell Disease. Experimental Therapies Might 
Have Cured Them., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/27/health
/sickle-cell-gene-therapy.html. The patients discussed in this article were not treated using CRISPR 
technology, but the article notes that CRISPR has potential for future use as a gene therapy in this 
realm. 
 24. Kathryn Ellen Foley, Chinese Scientists Used Crispr Gene Editing on 86 Human Patients, 
QUARTZ (Jan. 23, 2018), https://qz.com/1185488/chinese-scientists-used-crispr-gene-editing-on-
86-human-patients/. 
 25. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 1, at 111 n.1. 
 26. Caplan et al., supra note 8, at 1422 (“Gene drive is a powerful tool that makes it more 
likely that the edited trait will be passed on to offspring through sexual reproduction.”). 
 27. Id. at 1422. See Id. at 1423 Figure 1 for a useful diagram demonstrating a gene drive. 
 28. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 1, at 118. 
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B.  Ethical Considerations 
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress29 famously outlined the bio-
ethical principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and jus-
tice;30 all of which are relevant  and should be evaluated when considering 
the ethics of germline genome editing. 
1.  Autonomy 
The ethical principle of autonomy is focused on issues of an indi-
vidual’s liberty, privacy, choice, and freedom of will.31 Issues of auton-
omy are relevant to both somatic and germline genome editing. In the 
case of somatic genome editing, autonomy is key in terms of an individ-
ual’s desire to do what they want for their own body, whether that is ther-
apeutic treatment or enhancement. In regard to germline genome editing, 
the concept of autonomy is particularly relevant when considering future 
generations of “individuals who will be affected by the present interven-
tion.”32 Here, these individuals’ informed consent cannot be reached, and 
hence their autonomy is arguably contravened; future generations of 
those with germline edits have no say in the previous modifications to 
their present genome. Some, like Ruth Macklin, have argued that such an 
autonomy argument is a “red herring” and note that “the fact that they 
[future generations] did not—and could not—consent to being protected 
in that way does not demonstrate that their autonomy was somehow vio-
lated. Their autonomy is not yet in existence, so there is nothing to be 
violated.”33 However, others have raised this concern about the right of 
“future generations to be free of genetic alterations made without their 
consent.”34 Alta Charo notes that the “concern here is that a child [born 
with a germline edited modified genome] might feel less unique or less 
free simply by knowing that some of his or her traits were chosen by 
someone else,” and that such could be violative of individual rights “to 
the extent that human rights are founded on notions of autonomy and dig-
nity.”35 At the same time, concern for autonomy also comes into view for 
 
 29. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (4th 
ed. 1994). 
 30. Id. at 120, 189, 259, 326. 
 31. Id. at 120. 
 32. Ruth Macklin, Applying the Four Principles, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 275, 279 (2003). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Maha F. Munayyer, Genetic Testing and Germ-Line Manipulation: Constructing a New 
Language for International Human Rights, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 687, 698 (1997). 
 35. R. Alta Charo, Germline Engineering and Human Rights, 112 AJIL UNBOUND 344, 346 
(2018). Note that the notion of autonomy and its impact on human dignity is critical; the linkage of 
autonomy and human dignity is one of the key bridges of bioethics to human rights law. 
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parents who may desire to have their child born free of a certain disease, 
or born with an enhancement they desire. Hence, autonomy of both par-
ents and future children must be considered with respect to concerns 
about ethical autonomy and germline genome editing. 
2.  Non-maleficence and Beneficence 
The ethical principle of non-maleficence is essentially a duty to “do 
no harm,”36 and the principle of beneficence is the obligation to “act for 
the benefit of others.”37 These principles require a weighing of the degree 
in which such actions cause harm or help society; such a weighing of 
harms and benefits are appropriate for both somatic and germline genome 
editing technology. Implicit in the weighing of the consequences of ge-
nome editing (both at the somatic and germline levels) is the question of 
whether the given modification is a therapeutic treatment or enhance-
ment. This distinction is important and often there is no clear line between 
the two. “Enhancement is commonly understood to refer to changes that 
alter what is ‘normal,’”38 but what is “normal” or “natural” is certainly 
debatable.39 
A large component of the ethical debate concerning the “good” and 
“bad” consequences (relevant to both somatic and germline genome ed-
iting) is the concept of “genetic essentialism.”40 Genetic essentialism is 
the notion that “genes alone account for who humans are” or that “genet-
ics is the foundation of human nature.”41 Sometimes this notion of essen-
tialism suggests a flawed argument for over-regulation of genome edit-
ing; this relates especially to whether genome editing involves 
enhancement or treatment because enhancement is often viewed as 
changing the “foundation of human nature.”42 The Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, however, rejects the notion of an emphasis on genetic 
 
 36. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 29, at 189. 
 37. Id. at 260. 
 38. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 1, at 138. 
 39. The question of enhancement is complex and nuanced. For an excellent discussion on the 
nature of enhancement, see I. Glenn Cohen, What (If Anything) is Wrong With Human Enhance-
ment? What (If Anything) is Right With It?, 49 TULSA L. REV. 645, 685-86 (2014) (“While bioeth-
icists and lawyers talk about “enhancement” with some frequency, the borders of the concept are 
not well defined. Moreover, enhancements are not all homogenous, so it would be very foolish to 
try to take a singular position on “enhancement.”). 
 40. Eli Y. Adashi & I. Glenn Cohen, The Ethics of Heritable Genome Editing: New Consid-
erations in a Controversial Area, 320 JAMA 2531, 2531 (2018). 
 41. Id. Genetic essentialism is an idea often found in the popular culture which rests on the 
theory that genetics determines everything. This idea is of course not accurate; however, emphasis 
on genetic essentialism is often persuasive to the general public. 
 42. Id. 
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essentialism, noting that doing so “seems incoherent since the human ge-
nome is not a single, stable thing, nor is it distinct in particular from the 
genomes of other organisms.”43 
In addition, the weighing of the “good” and “bad” in the context of 
germline genome editing can yield a “precautionary principle,” where an 
emphasis of caution is placed on possible negative outcomes. For exam-
ple, “the extreme caution that individual geneticists and scientific organ-
izations have expressed regarding the unknowns, uncertainties, and po-
tential dangers of germline interventions suggest that precautionary 
principle may always be operative in this line of biomedical research [i.e. 
germline modification].”44 
3.  Justice 
The ethical principle of justice is derived from concepts of what is 
fair and equitable.45 Issues of justice are of concern for both somatic and 
germline genome editing. Consider the example of germline genome ed-
iting that would confer a benefit (such as a modification to help confer 
immunity):46 if such an “enhancement is available only to the upper clas-
ses, it can further widen the already existing gap between the more ad-
vantaged and less advantaged members of society and thus exacerbate 
injustices.”47 Ethically, the “benefits of heritable genome editing should 
not preferentially accrue only to the affluent individuals.”48 Indeed, there 
is a human rights aspect with regard to social justice, as “[t]he potential 
for discrimination against genetic groups increases dramatically as ge-
netic testing and [germline manipulation] techniques become less 
 
 43. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, GENOME EDITING AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION 92 
(2018), http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/Genome-editing-and-human-reproduction
-FINAL-website.pdf. 
 44. Macklin, supra note 32, at 279. Macklin is skeptical about apportioning too much caution 
to uncertain negative consequences. Macklin notes that, “much less plausible are the negative con-
sequences envisaged by opponents of germline interventions,” and that giving  voice to a “litany of 
potential  negative consequences” is “another illustration of opponents of a proposed action or pol-
icy inventing a fanciful array of worst case scenarios in seeking to demonstrate that the potential 
harms far outweigh the likely benefits.”   
 45. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 29, at 327. 
 46. Macklin, supra note 32, at 278. There may be some dispute about whether a modification 
to give immunity to HIV would be an enhancement or more in line with a therapeutic treatment. 
Because it is a modification that is “health related,” Macklin notes that, “since disease prevention 
is a central function of medicine and public health, enhanced protection against disease has not 
been questioned by opponents of other types of enhancement,” thus underscoring the debate that 
takes place around what is or is not an  “enhancement” may hinge on whether or not the proposed 
modification had some medicinal benefit. 
 47. Id. at 279. 
 48. Adashi & Cohen, supra note 40, at 2531 (referencing the Nuffield Council recommenda-
tion). 
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expensive, more reliable, and more widely available.”49 Maha Munayyer 
explains that “[germline manipulation] provoke[s] discrimination based 
on genetic status while simultaneously providing the means to alter that 
status.”50  An additional concern is that the price of the technology is yet 
another way that inequality may spread, as “editing is likely to be expen-
sive” and “[g]enetic disease, once a universal common denominator, 
could instead become an artifact of class, geographic location, and cul-
ture.”51 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Considering the multiple ethical issues germane to genome edit-
ing—particularly that of the germline and its consequential potential—, 
questions surface as to what the best ways are to regulate or police such 
biotechnology to ensure ethical practice.  International human rights law 
is a natural place to look for such a regulatory mechanism, in large part 
because of the linkage of bioethics and human rights.52 Indeed, legal 
scholars have noted that “at the beginning of the twenty-first century bi-
oethics and human genome modification started being discussed within 
the wider international human rights  framework and the even wider in-
ternational law framework.”53 The consequential power to shape human-
ity, as germline genome editing possesses, arguably makes the technol-
ogy  prime to fall under the jurisdiction of human rights law, as 
“[m]embership in the human species is central to the meaning and en-
forcement of human rights.”54 Recognizing the implicit linkage of human 
 
 49. Munayyer, supra note 34, at 719. 
 50. Id. at 720-21 (“At the very least, gene manipulation can create the social perception that 
genetic conditions are within human control, weakening the argument for protected status.”). 
 51. Ormond et al., supra note 13, at 172. 
 52. Richard E. Ashcroft, Could Human Rights Supersede Bioethics?, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
639, 639-40 (2010) (noting the relationship between bioethics and human rights “are two assem-
blages of concepts, practices and institutions which take a profound interest in, and exert consider-
able influence over, the practice of medicine, health policy and the life sciences and technologies”). 
 53. CESARE P.R. ROMANO, ANDREA BOGGIO, & JESSICA ALMQVIST, Chapter 2: The Gov-
ernance of Human (Germline) Genome Modification at the International and Transnational Level, 
in HUMAN GERMLINE GENOME MODIFICATION AND THE RIGHT TO SCIENCE: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF NATIONAL LAWS AND POLICIES, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 22 (Andrea Boggio, 
Cesare P.R. Romano, Jessica Almqvist eds., 2019) Authors note the relationship of international 
human rights law with regards to the governance of germline genome editing: “[g]overnance of 
human germline genome modification is a crucial but narrow facet of the larger question of the 
governance of human genome modification tout court, which, in turn, is a subset of a broader field, 
international bioethics law, which is itself a specialized branch of international law.” Id. at 31. 
 54. George J. Annas, Lori B. Andrews & Rosario M. Isasi, Protecting the Endangered Hu-
man: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations, 28 AM. J. 
L. & MED. 151, 153 (2002) (explaining that, “if we take human rights and democracy seriously, a 
decision to alter a fundamental characteristic in the definition of “human” [i.e., such an alteration 
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rights and the regulation of human genome editing, Andrea Boggio and 
other scholars stress that “[i]nternational human rights standards should 
be central to the development of germline engineering law” as some “na-
tional regulatory approaches” to the technology “fail to meet human 
rights standards.”55 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, established by the 
United Nations (UN) in 1948, is the seminal document in international 
human rights law and enshrines broad human rights principles.56 The dec-
laration is given effect and is more specifically addressed through nine 
core international human rights treaties: e.g., the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child.57 The declaration “sets out a list of principles that 
play an important role in bioethics,” including such principles as the right 
to health care, prohibition on discrimination, protection of privacy, and 
right to life.58 
Following the advent of the declaration, international human rights 
turned more specially to bioethics through a few key conventions and 
declarations—most notably Europe’s European Convention of Human 
Rights and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization’s (UNESCO) series of bioethics declarations—all of which 
are relevant to influencing germline genome editing. 
 
that heritable genetic alteration is capable of accomplishing] should not be made by any individual 
or corporation without wide discussion among all members of the affected population”). 
 55. Andrea Boggio, Barth M. Knoppers, Jessica Almqvist, & Cesare Romano, The Human 
Right to Science and the Regulation of Human Engineering, 2 CRISPR J.,134, 134 (2019). The 
authors say that  
[n]o matter how technical or specific legislation regulating germline engineering is, 
governments cannot depart from their international human rights obligations when de-
veloping regulatory frameworks. It is not just a matter of legality. It is a matter of 
legitimacy. International human rights standards are the legal articulation of widely 
agreed upon values. They are an expression of an internationally negotiated consensus. 
 56. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Dec. 10, 1948), https://
www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. 
 57. The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies, UN 
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professional
Interest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx. 
 58. Roberto Andorno, Global Bioethics and Human Rights, 27 MED. & L. 1, 2 (2008) (noting 
the Universal Declaration’s role in bioethics, and explaining how its preamble recognizes the prin-
ciple of  the “inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family;” a principle broadly reflective of bioethical principles).   
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A.  Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo Convention) 
A key piece in the bioethics framework of international human 
rights is the European Convention of Human Rights (known as the 
Oviedo Convention).59 Produced by the Council of Europe, the conven-
tion is a legally binding document between signatory European states,60 
codifying notions of bioethics into international human rights law.61 The 
Oviedo Convention has particular relevance in international law, as it is 
“not only the first, but still the only legally binding international treaty in 
bioethics.”62 Article 13 of the Convention speaks directly to the issue of 
genome modification, stating, “an intervention seeking to modify the hu-
man genome may only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or thera-
peutic purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in 
the genome of any descendants.”63 The language clearly makes a distinc-
tion between genome editing for either therapeutic or enhancement pur-
poses and favors genome editing for therapeutic purposes as an ethical 
option. But it also goes further, prohibiting “any modification of germline 
genes, whether for therapeutic or non-therapeutic aims.”64 
In addition, the Oviedo Convention notably focuses on the protec-
tion of “human dignity,”65 mirroring the emphasis placed on human dig-
nity displayed in UNESCO’s Declaration on the Human Genome and Hu-
man Rights (discussed below). The interplay of “human dignity” and its 
 
 59. EUR. CONSULT. ASS., Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo Conven-
tion), 4th Sess., Doc. No. 164 (1997) [hereinafter Oviedo Convention], https://www.coe.int/en/web/
conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/090000168007cf98. 
 60. While many European countries are signatories, some key nations such as the U.K. and 
Germany have not yet signed. See EUR. CONSULT. ASS., Committee on Bioethics, (May 17, 2019), 
https://rm.coe.int/inf-2019-2-etat-sign-ratif-reserves-bil-002-/16809979a8 (chart of signatures and 
ratifications). 
 61. Judit Sandor, Human Rights and Bioethics: Competitors or Allies? The Role of Interna-
tional Law in Shaping the Contours of a New Discipline, 27 MED. & L. 15, 17 (2008). 
 62. Peter Sykora & Arthur Caplan. The Council of Europe Should Not Reaffirm the Ban on 
Germline Genome Editing in Humans, 18 EMBO REPS. 1871 (2017). 
 63. Oviedo Convention, supra note 59, at art. 13. 
 64. Sykora & Caplan, supra note 62, at 1871. Sykora and Caplan are critical of the Oviedo 
Convention’s ban on germline editing and would prefer that the language be amended to further 
distinguish between therapeutic and non-therapeutic editing purposes in both somatic and germline 
editing. Currently, the language of Article 13 makes a distinction between somatic and germline 
editing, the latter of which is banned regardless of purpose. 
 65. Sandor, supra note 61, at 18 (noting that the notion of “human dignity” emphasized in the 
convention stems from French law and its value of human dignity in biomedicine); Francoise Baylis 
& Lisa Ikemoto. The Council of Europe and the Prohibition of Human Germline Genome Editing, 
18 EMBO REPS. 2084, 2084 (2017) (“[T]he Oviedo Convention, as currently worded, prioritizes 
[and quite properly so, in their view] human rights and human dignity over scientific ambition and 
the technological imperative.”). 
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meaning in the context of germline modification, critically offers a win-
dow into the understanding of broader human identity. 
B.  UNESCO Declarations 
Within the United Nations, the specialized agency known as 
UNESCO has been “dealing with the ethics of science ever since 1970.”66 
Since the 1990s, UNESCO has put forth multiple declarations in the 
realm of bioethics,67 three of which are explored below. 
1.  Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 
Another piece of international human rights doctrine directly rele-
vant to genome editing is the Universal Declaration on the Human Ge-
nome and Human Rights.68 In 1997, UNESCO created the declaration, 
which is composed of twenty-one articles, the first of which states, “the 
human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the 
human family, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and 
diversity. In a symbolic sense, it is the heritage of humanity.”69 The dec-
laration’s focus is substantially on “human dignity” in connection with 
practices involving the genome. While the declaration does not mention 
germline modification specifically70 (rather it mentions human cloning71), 
the broadness of the declaration’s language is inclusive of genome editing 
technology.72 However, the declaration does “not have the direct force of 
 
 66. Sandor, supra note 61, at 16. 
 67. Id. at 17. 
 68. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] Res. 29 
C/Res. 16, (Nov. 11, 1997), http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13177&URL_DO=DO_
TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 
 69. Id. at Article 1. Note how the declaration links together the human genome with the notion 
of human dignity, suggesting that the genome is fundamental to humanity’s essence. 
 70. See Tara R. Melillo, Gene Editing and the Rise of Designer Babies, 50 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 757, 787-88 (2017). Tara Melillo argues that the declaration should be amended 
to specifically add the language “such as germline genetic modifications” as an example of a prac-
tice contrary to human dignity, and thus impermissible under the declaration. 
 71. UNESCO 29 C/Res. 16, supra note 68, at art. 11. 
 72. Brooke Elizabeth Hrouda, “Playing God?”: An Examination of the Legality of CRISPR 
Germline Editing Technology Under the Current International Regulatory Scheme and the Univer-
sal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 46 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 221, 233 
(2017) ( “[The Declaration’s] articles establish that technology [i.e., technology associated with the 
human genome] cannot overstep boundaries by interfering with the inherent right of human dig-
nity.”). 
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law”73 and merely serves as guidance for nations to pass laws that “pro-
hibit those genetic practices that are contrary to human dignity.”74 
The larger question thus becomes: what constitutes “human dig-
nity?” One answer is that human dignity is “respect derived automatically 
from one’s status as a human being.”75 Therefore, some scholars argue 
that alterations to the genome for “enhancement” purposes is a type of 
transhumanism that violates human dignity.76 Indeed, this line of thinking 
supports the declaration as an ethical tool that can be used to protect 
against violations of “human dignity” conducted via genetic alterations 
meant to enhance a human being.77 As some scholars argue, violations of 
human dignity via enhancement genome editing calls into question the 
personhood status of individuals with an altered genome, thus yielding 
profound implications on the rights and status of such individuals.78 This 
is particularly acute under a theory of “personhood” that emphasizes bi-
ology and genetics as determinative. Such a worldview that “implicitly 
assumes that the totality of human DNA is the source of a human essence” 
will invariably harm “the biological legacy” of children with germline 
modifications and risk “their entitlement to human rights and legal pro-
tections.”79 In other words, human rights protections may be in doubt be-
cause germline modified individuals could potentially be deemed as pos-
sessing a trans-altered personhood status, thus removing them from the 
normative status entitled to such protections. 
2.  International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 
As an extension of the 1997 Declaration discussed above,80 
UNESCO enacted the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 
 
 73. Id. at 223; see also Bridget Toebes, Sex Selection Under International Human Rights Law, 
9 MED. L. INT’L 197, 207 (2008) (Toebes explains that declarations may be deemed “soft law” 
instruments” which have “no strict legal obligation, yet there is a growing reliance upon these in-
struments [i.e., declarations] by lawyers and academics, which reinforces their legal status”). 
 74. Annas, Andrews & Isasi, supra note 54, at 171-72. 
 75. Hrouda, supra note 72, at 234. 
 76. Alexandra M. Franco, Transhuman Babies and Human Pariahs: Genetic Engineering, 
Transhumanism, Society and the Law, 37 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 185, 186, 187 n.24 (2017) (defining 
transhumanism as “a genetically engineered human enhanced beyond baseline human capabilities). 
 77. Id. at 194 (observing how scholars Annas, Andrews and Isasi “espouse the idea that human 
rights attach to some essential aspect of biological ‘humanity’ as a justification to oppose Transhu-
manism and germline genetic engineering technologies”). 
 78. Note that “personhood” and “human dignity” are linked concepts. See Hrouda, supra note 
72, at 234, 241 ( “[H]uman dignity means at its core: the right to respect one’s individual person-
hood and uniqueness” and that human dignity “values individual personhood above all else.”). 
 79. Franco, supra note 76, at 201-02. 
 80. Andorno, supra note 58, at 4. 
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in 2003.81 This declaration focused on the “rules for the collection, use 
and storage of human biological samples” and the “genetic data” that can 
be yielded from such collections.82 While this declaration deals with sev-
eral bioethical principles (e.g., dignity, privacy, consent, discrimination), 
particularly noteworthy is its treatment of identity: 
Each individual has a characteristic genetic make-up. Neverthe-
less, a person’s identity should not be reduced to genetic char-
acteristics, since it involves complex educational, environmen-
tal and personal factors and emotional, social, spiritual and 
cultural bonds with others and implies a dimension of freedom.83 
The declaration’s emphasis on identity is particularly interesting, es-
pecially in the context of genome editing and its propensity to alter an 
individual’s genetic code. The language of the declaration appears to 
push back against notions of genetic essentialism, viewing human iden-
tity as greater than the mere genetic make-up of an individual. Such a 
view tends to support a notion of human dignity and identity for all indi-
viduals (or future generations), no matter how genetically altered they 
may be for either therapeutic or enhancement purposes. 
3.  Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
Another widely relevant UNESCO declaration is the Universal Dec-
laration on Bioethics and Human Rights.84 UNESCO created this decla-
ration in 2005 and it is “more general in character,” speaking to bioethical 
principles more broadly.85 Indeed, it has been viewed as the “first inter-
governmental global instrument that comprehensively addressed the link-
age between human rights and bioethics.”86 It is similar to the Oviedo 
Convention, in the sense that they both reflect broad bioethical principles 
of autonomy, consent, privacy, and equitable access to health care. 
 
 81. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] Res. 32 
C/Res. 22 (Oct. 16, 2003), http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=17720&URL_DO=DO_
TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 
 82. Andorno, supra note 58, at 4. 
 83. UNESCO 32 C/Res. 22, supra note 81, at art. 3. 
 84. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] Res. 33 
C/Res. 36 (Oct. 19, 2005), http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31058&URL_DO=DO_
TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 
 85. Toebes, supra note 73, at 209. 
 86. Andorno, supra note 58, at 4 (contemplating that the entire declaration “is conceived as 
an extension of international human rights law into the field of biomedicine”) (emphasis omitted). 
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C.  Limitations of International Human Rights Law 
There are significant limitations in using international human rights 
law to govern the bioethical ramifications of germline genome editing.  
The first is that creating a binding international treaty, with key nations 
as signatories (e.g, China, U.S., U.K, Germany, India), is extremely dif-
ficult given the current (or truly any) political climate.87 Another chal-
lenge is that declarations (like the UNESCO declarations discussed 
above) are non-binding, and therefore some argue that declarations are 
the world’s best global governance option, as they are more feasible than 
a binding treaty and have persuasive influence in the creation of norma-
tive conduct.88 In addition, because the enforcement of international hu-
man rights law is a recurring problem, some scholars argue that further 
attempts to enforce such treaties are unproductive and recognize that hu-
man rights law is no longer in a “golden age.”89 
There is also concern about how bioethical reasoning will find its 
way into the realm of law, particularly because there is now a clear over-
lap of bioethics and law rooted in human rights. As Richard Ashcroft 
notes, “there is no good reason to think that bioethical modes of reasoning 
will be taken up by courts and policy-makers as tools of reasoning…in 
contexts where the applications of rights-based reasoning is unclear, am-
biguous or unhelpful [i.e, contexts where bioethics reasoning may help 
resolve an ambiguity].”90 
Additionally, it is important to consider how international law may 
have limitations due to its potential inconsistency with an existing 
 
 87. Melillo, supra note 70, at 785 ( “[T]he current political climate hinders the likelihood of 
negotiating such a treaty.”). 
 88. Id. at 788-89. Melillo reflects on the benefits of declarations versus treaties, explaining 
that “a treaty would likely be unsuccessful at remedying the lack of an international consensus on 
gene editing, but a declaration provides a solution far less adverse to a country’s autonomy” and 
that “a declaration can indicate international consensus, absent the complexities and complications 
necessary in drafting, enacting, and ratifying a treaty.” 
 89. See Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era, 96 TEX. L. REV. 
279, 279, 320-25, 349 (2017). In her article, Wuerth outlines the history of how human rights have 
“expanded and changed international law in ways that have made it weaker, less likely to generate 
compliance and more likely to produce interstate friction and conflict.” Wuerth illuminates  how 
enforcement of international human rights is nearly impossible in the modern era, as a result of a 
historical record of non-compliance and unaccountability. 
 90. Ashcroft, supra note 52, at 659. Ashcroft further explains, “traditional modes of legal 
reasoning, policy formation, and decision-making will not, and have no reason to, cede the field to 
the methods of (academic) bioethics.” Here, Ashcroft reminds readers that while courts and policy-
makers may be taking up bioethical issues in the context of human rights law, they will likely still 
use legal reasoning to make decisions, not the academic modes of reasoning traditionally used in 
the field of bioethics. This could be considered a limitation on effectuating or merging bioethical 
principles into human rights law. 
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country’s national law. A prime example of this is when U.S. constitu-
tional law competes with a human rights treaty; which law—the consti-
tution or international law (e.g., a human rights treaty)—has supremacy 
as applied to U.S citizens?91 This question would be relevant under cir-
cumstances where a human rights treaty may circumscribe a right guar-
anteed under constitutional law. An example of this could be a treaty that 
functions as a moratorium on germline genome editing,92 which arguably 
conflicts with constitutional rights of reproductive liberty. There is clear 
constitutional precedent with regard to rights guaranteeing reproductive 
liberty; note that a constitutional rights argument premised on privacy 
and reproductive liberty is reflective of the bioethical principle of paren-
tal autonomy.93 However, it is important to remember that not all perspec-
tives of autonomy will be the same world-wide (e.g., different cultures 
will have different views on reproductive liberty). Such differences serve 
as a reminder of another key limitation of human rights law: bioethical 
principles are not uniform across the world and are strongly influenced 
by culture.94 Hence, one set of global laws outlined in a single treaty or 
declaration will invariably come into conflict when applied to individual 
nations, as different cultures will have different sets of values and differ-
ent understandings of bioethics and human rights. 
Lastly, it is important to remember that any global governance struc-
ture that  comes from a treaty or declaration is only intended to bind or 
 
 91. See Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1999, 1999-2000 (2003). Spiro explores this notion of supremacy by asking the question: 
“Can a treaty override an individual right protected under the Constitution?” In answering this 
question, Spiro notes that while the long-standing doctrine of “Constitutional Hegemony” suggests 
the constitution is supreme over a treaty, the reality is more complex, especially with the rise of 
human rights in the canon of international law. 
 92. Debate about the necessity of an international moratorium on germline editing is currently 
ongoing. While debate is spirited, consensus seems to be converging towards overall support of a 
moratorium on germline editing; if an international treaty were to spring forth tomorrow, a mora-
torium on germline editing for reproductive and clinical purposes would likely be included. See 
also Eric Lander et al., Adopt a Moratorium on Heritable Genome Editing, NATURE (Mar. 16, 
2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00726-5; Charo, supra note 35. See generally 
Adashi & Cohen, supra note 40. 
 93. Annas, Andrews & Isasi, supra note 54, at 167 n.81. The authors note that, “[t]he right to 
make decisions about whether or not to bear children is constitutionally protected under the consti-
tutional right to privacy.” Right to privacy arguments about reproduction may extend to parents 
asserting that they have the right to have the kind of child they want, i.e. a so-called “designer 
baby”—a child whose genome is edited to their parents’desire. 
 94. David C. Thomasma, Proposing a New Agenda: Bioethics and International Human 
Rights, 10 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 299, 302 (2001). Thomasma explains how notions 
of autonomy vary in different cultures, noting how in some Western countries “the individual is 
identified as the locus of decisional capacity for informed consent,” whereas the “very concept of 
informed consent is almost meaningless in societies that stress the overriding importance of an 
individual’s relationship with family and community.” 
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influence individual nation-states, assuming that parties to such treaties 
would use their own national legal framework to enforce relevant matters 
in their jurisdiction. However, the relevant matters that national govern-
ments generally tackle are not always easily enforceable or identifiable 
in this rapidly changing world of bio-medical advancements. For exam-
ple, there is already a growing movement of DIY-Bio or “bio-hackers,” 
who are buying CRISPR kits and are doing genetic modifications at 
home, outside of the knowledge or purview of any government agency or 
regulatory authority.95 Under such circumstances, even if a government 
follows international human rights law to regulate germline genome ed-
iting, it may only have influence over the traditional users of biomedical 
technology, i.e., corporations and university medical centers. No matter 
how effective any form of international oversight may be, gaps will re-
main in policing the ethical practice of germline genome editing. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Recent events have provided impetus into both the ethical and gov-
ernance analysis of genome editing. Issues of autonomy, non-malefi-
cence, beneficence, and justice are all relevant and must be weighed. The 
consequences of germline genome editing can be profound, even unpre-
dictable and difficult to quantify at the moment; it may take many years 
before the full consequences of certain heritable modifications are under-
stood.96 As Jennifer Doudna, one of the key discoverers of CRISPR, cau-
tions: “it’s important to recognize that we do now have the power to con-
trol evolution.”97 
Looking to international human rights law as the face of governance 
is logical; human rights (and the bioethical principles subsumed) are key 
in providing guidance to humanity in the face of the new powers created 
by scientific discovery. Indeed “[s]cience cannot tell us what we should 
do, or even what our goals are, therefore, humans must give direction 
[i.e., direction via human rights] to science.”98 Because the consequences 
of germline genome editing are global in scale and affect all people, the 
 
 95. Nancy M. P. King, Human Gene-Editing Research: Is the Future Here Yet?, 97 N.C. L. 
REV. 1051, 1080 (2019). King notes that the rise of CRISPR bio-hacking is an example of how 
there is a “proliferation of regulatory and oversight mechanisms replete with gaps and overlaps.” 
 96. Amy Gutmann & Jonathan D. Moreno, Keep CRISPR Safe: Regulating a Genetic Revo-
lution, 97 FOREIGN AFF. 171, 174 (2018) (noting that the reality is that it may take hundreds of 
years to detect any changes) (“Unlike the generations of rapidly propagating species, such as mos-
quitos, human generations span many years, so any harmful change in a human germline could take 
decades or even centuries to become pronounced.”). 
 97. Jennifer Doudna, The Ultimate Life Hacker, 97 FOREIGN AFF. 158, 164 (2018). 
 98. Annas, Andrews & Isasi, supra note 54, at 173. 
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international structure of human rights law is appropriate. Conceding the 
many limitations of international human rights law, it is, at its essence, 
the correct body of law to help guide humanity through the challenges 
raised by genome editing technology. Therefore, international human 
rights deserve the focus and energy needed to make it a stronger and more 
effective governance strategy for germline genome editing. Indeed, how 
the concepts of human identity and human species are defined and under-
stood in the future depends on our emphasis on international human rights 
in the present. 
